Ernst U. von Weizsaecker |
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figure 31 |
The idea is
to make resource rationalization more profitable than labor rationalization.
This has certainly been the philosophy behind the ecological tax
reform which has been introduced in most European countries, including
Germany. The ideal scenario is one in which prices for energy, water
and raw materials increase slowly, for instance by four percent
annually, so that technological progress can approximately keep
pace.
If, for instance, petrol becomes four percent dearer every year
while the car fleet, going towards hypercar, becomes three percent
more efficient every year, then the marginal price to be paid by
car users is only one percent of petrol prices, which is only a
very small part of your daily expenses. So there is no social problem
involved. And yet after 15 or 20 or 25 years the car fleet will
be twice as efficient, so your imports of Saudi crude oil can be
cut in half, which is excellent for your economy.
Also, if you use the revenue from these eco-taxes to reduce indirect
labor costs, then for the employer it becomes more profitable, more
attractive, to maintain the labor force. Compared with today, it
is more reasonable to lay off kilowatt hours and barrels of oil
and to hire people. This is exactly what we want in most OECD countries.
Of course, many other measures can be added. For instance, tradable
permits of carbon dioxide emissions could be a reasonable tool on
the international scale. Eco-audits have become very popular in
Japan, in Germany and a few other countries, and there are voluntary
agreements with industry and many other such measures.
This morning I had a chance at the United Nations University to
address a second huge challenge, if redirecting technological progress
is not large enough a challenge. Namely, the second challenge is
reinventing democracy. Democracy, in its modern form, was developed
for the nation state. Now that ecological challenges are global
and strategic decisions in the public and private sectors mostly
relate to the global economy, we have to rethink the role of democracy.
Democracy is meant to defend and represent the public domains and
protect the weaker ones against the overwhelming power of the strong.
Markets, on the other hand, are meant to encourage the strong to
beat the weak. You shouldn't blame markets for doing that. This
is how they are meant.
Contrary to typical American perceptions, markets and democracy
are not the same. To the contrary, they are rather complementary
with each other, and the real objective of democracy is to balance
these two principles.
Globalization means a systematic weakening of democracy and the
public domain to the advantage of markets and of accumulation of
private goods. Reinventing democracy, therefore, means to rebalance
private and public goods. It implies that all people's interests,
including, in particular, the interest of the less fortunate and
of future generations, will have to be represented somewhere. They
will never be part of the markets, almost by definition.
Time is much too short today to dwell on this additional similarly
huge program. Of course, in my new capacity as the Parliamentary
Chairman of the Committee on Economic Globalization, I have to work
on this question. But what I want to convey to you in the end is
that our efforts on redirecting technological progress are likely
to fail unless we undertake efforts in parallel for reinventing
democracy, and I hope that all of you in this room and all of you
involved in the Takeda Foundation will be part of this additional
fascinating game.
Thank you very much. |
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